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by Elizabeth Barker Brandt
A number of revoked wills and
trusts, a trust that has been
J amended several times, substan-
tial gifls to charity, the last trust amend-
ment handwritten ol the back of a Medi-
care check stub and beginning with the
phrase "If anything happens to me on the
trip to La Jolla ..."  Does this take you back
to law school and to those twisted fact
patterns that only a law professor could
dream up? Well dream became reality in
the case of Esale ?f Kik I decided last
year by the Idaho Supreme Court. The
case involved very unusual facts and pre-
sented several important issues to the Su-
preme Court including the applicability of
Idaho's former mortmain statute to an
inter vivos trust, the admissibility of ex-
trinsic evidence to interpret a trust, and
the applicability of Idaho's statute dealing
with the suspension of the power of alien-
ation to charitable trusts.
Muriel Kirk was an unusual woman.
Described variously in the court records as
a "Renaissance woman" and as like
"Auntie Maine", she was a lawyer who
practiced law for a time in Oklahoma, a
real estate agent, a pilot, an art collector,
and a world traveler. In December 1989,
she executed an inter vivos trust and pour-
over will naming herself as trustee and life
beneficiary of the revocable trust, and
naming West One Bank as the successor
trustee and personal representativc of her
estate. Her daughter, Diana, was named
Mulnei Kirk ana coinl]2(lpon Mr. cnirisloptier.
as the primary remainder beneficiary of the
trust along with the Assistance League of
Boise and the Milton Academy where Diana
had gone to school. The trust was registered
in Ada County and was funded. The trust
instrument provided that it could be
amended as follows:
The Grantor may at any time dur-
ing her lifetime amend the provi-
sions of the MURIEL H. KIRK
FAMILY TRUST by an instru-
ment signed by the Grantor and
delivered to the Trustee,
2
Six months later, in June 1990, as a
result of Diana's untimely death, Mrs.
Kirk amended the trust for the first time
eliminating the gifts to Diana and leaving
the Assistance League and the Milton Acad-
emy as the only beneficiaries of the trust.
In October 1990, Mrs. Kirk amended
the trust a second time eliminating the
Milton Academy. In the amendment, she
explained that Diana had been introduced
to smoking while at school at the Academy
which had eventually "ruined her life." In
addition to eliminating the Milton Acad-
emy from the trust, this second amend-
ment to the trust contained the following
provision:
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Afler the death of the Grantor, the
Trustee shall hold, manage and
control the property comprising the
Trust estate for beneficiaries to be
named in an attached sheet, which
will be added to from time to time.
3
Both the first and second amendments to
the trust were typed, formally executed by
Muriel Kirk and delivered to West One
Bank, the successor Trustee.
The same day that Muriel Kirk ex-
ecutcd the second amendment to the trust
she also drafted a list of dispositions of
personal property to several people which
was typed, signed, attached to the second
amendment as provided by its express lan-
guage and which she delivered to West One
Bank.
As a result of the second amendment to
her trust, Mrs. Kirk arguably left a gap in
the disposition of her property. Although
the typed list attached to the second amend-
ment contained provisions disposing of
certain personal property and the trust in-
strument disposed of certain leases to the
Assistance League, tile trust did not contain
provisions disposing of the rest of Mrs.
Kirk's real estate. Mrs. Kirk was aware of
this potential problem and she was re-
minded of it on several occasions by Wcs
Seideman, the officer of West One Bank
with whom she had been dealing.
In May 1990, Mrs. Kirk planned to
drive to La Jolla, California. Apparently in
anticipation of this trip and aware of the
potential gap in her estate plan, she drafted
a handwritten list of property dispositions
on the back of a Medicare check stub and
stapled this document to the second amend-
nent to her trust. This handwritten instru-
ment began with the phrase "If anything
happens to me on the trip to La Jolla ..."
and, after listing several dispositions or
items of personal property contained the
following provision:
Donna and Joyce will take plenty
of time to sell other property at
proper prices [no rushed sale
Brooks!] then 1/3 goes to law chair
for Donna's Allen - 2/3 to Botani-
cal Garden for English garden
dedicated to Muriel and Diana.
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Mrs. Kirk reumcd safely from the trip
to La Jolla but died unexpectedly two months
later. An heir search conducted by West
One Bank, the personal representative of
her estate, located Fred Salfeety, her
nephew. Salfeety barely knew Muriel
Kirk. He testified at trial that he met her
for the first time at his mother's funeral.
His parents had been divorced and he had
been raised by his father's family, and, as
a result, knew little of his mother's family.
He stated that he hadn't seen Muriel Kirk
for twenty to thirty years.
Aside from the eccentric facts, the
Kirk case is notable for several reasons.
For the first time in a reported opinion
since 1945, the Idaho Supreme Court ad-
dressed the interpretation of Idaho's
mortmain statute. The Court also ad-
dressed for the first time whether Idaho's
perpetuities substitute applies to chari-
table gifts. Finally, and possibly most
importantly, the Court decided several
questions regarding the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence to interpret a trust pro-
vision.
For the first time in a
reported opinion since





Because the handwritten dispositions
on the back of the check stub to the Law
School and to the Botanical Gardens were
written within 120 days of Muriel Kirk's
death, the question was raised whether
this disposition violated the mortmain
statute. 5 At the magistrate level, Judge
Patricia Flanagan originally ruled the dis-
positions did not violate the mortmain
statute because that statute only applcd to
dispositions by will or by a testamentary
trust. The handwritten dispositions in the
Kirk case were amendments to an inter
vivos trust, and conse uently were not
governed by the statute.'
On appeal to the District Court, Judge
Newhouse affirmed the ruling of Judge
Flanagan on the mortmain statute on dif-
ferent grounds. Judge Newhouse reasoned
that because the inter vivos trust was, for all
intents and purposes, the same as a dispo-
sition by will or by testamentary trust, the
mortmain statute applied, He held, how-
ever, that the mortmain statute violated
equal protection principles and was, there-
fore, unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court adopted Judge
Flanagan's narrow reading of the statute
holding that, by the its express language,
the statute only applied to wills and testa-
mentary trusts. T he Supreme Court de-
cl ined to address the constitutionality ques-
tion.
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Despite the fact that Idaho repealed
the mortmain statute in question in Kirk in
1994, the Court's narrow reading ofit and
the questionable constitutional status of
the statute has significance for Idaho's
statute restricting devises to nursing homes
and residential home operators. That pro-
vision, Idaho Code § 15-2-616, was added
to the code in 1989 and is in some ways a
specialized mortmain statute for nursing
homes and their operators. The nursing
home statute imposes a rebuttable pre-
sumption that any "devise or bequest" to an
owner, operator, or employee of a nursing
home within one year of the testator's
death is the result of undue influence.
Like the mortmain statute at issue in
Kirk, the nursing home provision is lim-
ited in its applicability to "devises and
bequests". A strong argument could be
made that the same narrow interpretation
of this statutory language should apply to
the nursing home statute. And, like
mortrmain statutes generally, the nursing
home provision amounts to a restriction on
the testator's power of disposition even
under circumstances where undue influ-
ence could not actually be proved. The
only difference between the nursing home
provision and a traditional mortmain stat-
ute is that the nursing home provision
imposes only a rebuttable presumption that
covered dispositions are invalid, whereas
most mortmain statutes conclusively de-
clare covered dispositions invalid. Whether
this distinction is enough to save the nurs-
ing home provision is open to debate.
Suspension of the Power of Alienation
The trust instruments in the Kirk case
provided that certain oil leases owned by
Muriel Kirk should not be sold but should
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be maintained to provide income to the
charitable beneficiaries. Salfeety argued
that this violated Idaho's perpetuitics sub-
stitute statute. That statute provides that
the "absolute power of alienation of real
property" cannot be suspended fora period
of longer than "the continuance ofthe lives
of the persons in being at the creation of the
limitation or condition, and 25 years there-
after." Because the trust expressly pro-
vided for holding the oil leases in perpetu-
ity, the question was whether this violated
the statute.
Section 55-111 of the Idaho Code
expressly provides that "there shall be no
rule against perpetuities" and has tradi-
tionally been viewed as a substitute for the
rule against perpetuities in this state. The
code provision is narrower than the tradi-
tional rule, primarily in the fact that it does
not require vesting within the specified
period, it does not apply to personal prop-
erty and that it expressly provides that
instruments shall be construed to avoid
violating the statute. Despite the apparent
intent on the part of the Idaho Legislature
to repeal the rule against perpetuities in
Idaho, the Idaho courts have looked at how
other states have approached the rule
against perpetuities in interpreting the
Idaho statute. In Kirk, the court did just
that in concluding that the statute did not
apply to charitable trusts.
Applying the Idaho statute to chari-
table trusts would have seriously limited
the usefulness of those instruments. The
purpose behind the traditional rule against
perpetuities was to limit the unproductive
dead hand control of private property that
would take that property out of productive
use and apply it for potentially arcane
purposes. Most charitable gifts are not
made to a particular individual but are
rather to all entity and the goal of the donor
is that property should be maintained for
the benefit of the charity for a significant
period of time. Dead hand control of
private wealth is not as much of an issue
where the testator has already alienated
property outside his or her family and
applied it to quasi-public charitable pur-
poses. Moreover, charitable trusts, unlike
private trusts, are modifiable under the
doctrine of cy pres. For these reasons,
charitable trusts have often been treated as
outside the traditional rule against perpe-
tuities.
The decision of the Idaho Supreme
Court in Kirk is consistent with the result
in traditional perpetuities cases and with
the purpose of the Idaho statute. To the
extent that the Idaho rule regarding the
suspension of the power of alienation is
different than the traditional rule against
perpetuities, it was intended to make the
rule against perpetuities less broad in Idaho
than it had traditionally been. It would be
outside the spirit ofthe Idaho rule to inter-
pret it to place greater restrictions on the
power of disposition than Would the tradi-
tional rule against perpetuilies.
Admission of Extrinsic Evidence
Tile opinion in Kirk is also interesting
for its holding on the admission of extrin-
sic evidence. This is an area ofprobate law
that is in some flux. The traditional ap-
proach to the admission of extrinsic evi-
dence in the interpretation of a will or trust
is the "plain meaning rule." Under this
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rule, courts have refused to admit extrinsic
evidence that adds to or contradicts the
testator's will. Extrinsic evidence will not
come in to explain a patent ambiguity -
one that appears on the face of the docu-
ment, but will be admissible to cure a latent
ambiguity - one that does not appear on
the face of the will, but instead appears
when the will is applied to the testator's
property or beneficiaries. The Court in
Kirk applied this traditional rule and ex-
pressly held that the ambiguity involved in
the interpretation of Muriel Kirk's docu-
ments was a latent ambiguity and that
extrinsic evidence was therefore admis-
sible to resolve the ambiguity.
The latent/patent distinction for the
adtnissibilily of extrinsic evidence is prob-
lenatic, at best. The Kirk case illustrates
the problem. Arguably the ambiguity in
Kirk was patent. One did not have to apply
the will to Kirk's property and beneficia-
ries to see that she had not specified what
should happen to her property if she re-
turned from La Jolla, or to know that she
altered and changed beneficiaries in a po-
tential ly incomplete and contradictory way.
Rather than continuing to struggle
with this confusing and oflen unhelpful
distinction between latent and patent am-
biguities, some jurisdictions have adopted
an alternative approach to the admission of
extrinsic evidence. Focusing on the goal of
discovering the testator or settlor's intent,
these courts have reasoned that extrinsic
evidence of the circumstances surround-
ing the execution of the will should be
considered by the court, and evidence that
tends to establish a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the will should be admitted regard-
less of whether the ambiguity is latent or
patent. 9 This rule would not have resulted
in a different outcome in the Kirk case, but
would have helped resolve future extrinsic
evidence cases and would tip the balance
toward the admission ofextrinsic evidence
to interpret wills and trusts.
Conclusion
Even with a number of years of prac-
tice making up law school exams, I don't
know that I have ever come up with an
exam as interesting as the real facts of
Kirk. One thing I am constantly struck by
in the area of trusts and estates is that no
fact pattern can be considered too unusual.
Come to think of it, I might use the facts of
Kirk for the next exam I write for my Wills
and Trusts class!
ENDNOTES
1127 Idaho 817, 91)7 P.2d 794 (Idaho 1995).
2 hat 825, 907 p. 2d at 802.
31hL
41d. at 821, 917 p. 2d at 798.
5The statute, fornerly codified at Idaho Code § 15-2-
615(a)provided:
Noestate, real orpersonal, shall be bequeathedor
devised to any charitable orbenevolent society orcorpo-
ration,ortoanyperson orpersons in tnst rorcharitable
uses, except the same be done bywill dulyexecuted at
least one hundred twenty (121)) days before the death of
lie testator; and i fso made at least one hundred twenty
(120) days prior to such death, such devise or legacy,
andeach oftltem, shall be valid; provided, however, that
Ihe foregoing limitation shall not apply to wills of
persons whose death is caused by accidental nicansand
whose wills are executed prior to the accident which
results in deatlt.
The statute was repealed in 1994,seeS.L. 1994,ch. 359
§ 1.
' state of Kirk, Case No. 31- 15062 at 15-16(41h Dist.,
Mag. Div., June 16, 1993).
7Kirk, 127 Idaho at 8723, 907 P.2d at 811110.
Tlic constitutionality oFthe mnortmain statute isagain
being presented to the Court in the currently prding
case of Estate ofr tt, Case No. 311-15090 (4t f Dist.
Mug. Div. Mem. Dec. Filed Mar. 20, 1995). SU John
R. Mag. Div. Mene. Dec. Filed Mar. 20, 1995). See
John R. Cunningham, Mortmain Statutes: The Dcad
Iland Still Survivs, 27 Idaho L. Rev. 49 (1991)(dis-
cussing the possible constitutional problems with
mortmain statutes).
9 ForexamplesW sW. McGovern, ctal. ju note It0,
6.1, at 238-243.
Elizabeth Barker
Bralih is a Professor
at the University of
Idaho College al"Lan'
(aid teaches i the ai-
eas qf Trusis and Es-
tales, Conilnuniti ,
Proper *', and Fantily
Law. Sie has been a
inenther of the College




AT YOUR SERVIE ...










[Bar Group Insurance Endorsements
[fAnnual Meeting





For more information about any of these benefits, call the
Idaho State Bar at (208) 334-4500
24 The Advocate * July 1996
